Operation Gyroscope and the 3d Armored Division
Operation Gyroscope and the 3d Armored Division
By Bryan Smeathers
1 Jan 2025
On 23 July 1955 the 1st Infantry Division “The Big Red One” steamed into New York harbor aboard the USNS Upshur. It was accorded the most impressive reception given to any military organization since WWII. The event was given full radio, television and newspaper coverage, for this was not only the divisions’ first homecoming since 1942, but the first large movement of personnel from Europe to the United States under OPERATION GYROSCOPE, a new and revolutionary system of troop rotation and replacement.
Rather than using the older system of individual troop rotation and replacement, Operation GYROSCOPE would periodically interchange entire divisions, separate regiments and battalions between overseas assignments and their permanent stations in the United States. The families of married personnel would accompany them concurrently. Additionally, after the completion of basic training and advanced individual training (AIT), an individual soldier normally would remain with one and the same unit for all, or at least a majority of his Army career. The families as well as increasing combat readiness of the Army while simultaneously lowering the costs of maintaining the military establishment.
According to then Army Chief of Staff General Matthew B. Ridgway, “the most
important consideration favoring Operation GYROSCOPE was the likelihood that troop morale
would improve through greater permanency of enlisted men’s assignments.”
Other factors favoring the operation GYROSCOPE were the stability of family life for
the soldiers, Esprit de Corps; deep seated loyalty to a unit could scarcely result from rotations of
the old system. GYROSCOPE on the other hand would provide the permanency of assignment
necessary for establishing pride in a unit. This would be especially true for career personnel.
The military considerations of operation GYROSCOPE were the favorable factors
expected to grow out of unit rotation plan were retention of experienced personnel, better
teamwork, improved utilization of manpower, a strengthened ready reserve and valuable
experience in directing mass movements. It was also believed that the application of operation
GYROSCOPE would result in financial savings accounting to millions of dollars annually,
largely through increased reenlistment rates, mass movement processing, and improved
maintenance of equipment.
Army Regulation 220-20 published 20 October 1954 and revised six months later
governed the initial movements of Operation GYROSCOPE and set forth its operating
principles.The length of tours were 33 months overseas and U.S. tours of 31 months, plus 2 months
travel time, were estimated to be the most efficient.
The merits of unit rotation were never seriously in question, but its introduction was
delayed by the heavy requirements of the Korean conflict. With the end of that conflict the Army
plans for Operation GYROSCOPE began to take shape and, in the summer of 1954, they were
submitted to the major overseas commands for comment. To USAEUR the plan was submitted
formally by a Department of the Army briefing team at USAEUR headquarters in Heidelberg
(West) Germany on 9 August 1954. On the following day representatives of Seventh Army, VII
Corps and USAEUR general and technical staff attended another briefing, followed by a
conference to coordinate their positions.
The GYROSCOPE scope plan was approved and appeared in a distributed press release
in September 1954 announcing the approval and for the program to begin 1 July 1955. In
GYROSCOPE I the 10th Infantry Division at Ft. Riley, Kansas would exchange stations with the
1st Infantry Division in USAEUR, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Ft. George G. Meade,
Maryland would replace the 2d Armored Calvary Regiment in USAEUR. Two days later the
Army Chief of Staff released the necessary message of confirmation.
The Army announced in March 1955 that the 3d Armored Division (Spearhead) at Fort
Knox, Kentucky would be converted from a training unit to a full-strength tactical division and
moreover, the 3d Armored Division’s new cadre and filler personnel were to be GYROSCOPE-
qualified. This presented the 3d Armored Division with the double problem of internal
reorganization and full attainment of GYROSCOPE posture, all within one year’s time.
Originally, the 3d Armored Division was to be operationally ready with 72 hours after
arrival in West Germany, but later instructions stipulated that it would be ready immediately
upon arrival in West Germany.
Other problems grew out of difficulty of exchanging equipment between armored and an
infantry division. The Department of the Army stated that the only items to be brought to Europe
by the 3d Armored Division would be those that could not be obtained either from the departing
4th Infantry Division or from USAEUR stocks. Under the modernization program, USAEUR
would be provided with some medium tanks directly, and would be able to furnish them to the 3d
Armored Division, whereas M-48 tanks and special artillery were to be furnished in the US and
shipped overseas with the division. When it was recommended that all future M-48 tanks issued
to the 4th Infantry Division to equipped with armored-type radios to eliminate the issuance of 16
new sets The new sets issued were boxed and installed before the 3d Armored Division arrived.
In February 1956 additional signal equipment for the armored division began to arrive from the
US and thereafter the plans for transferring equipment worked on schedule until the rotation was
completed. All 4th Infantry Division equipment that would not be needed by the 3d Armored
Division was inventoried and returned to supply depots in West Germany.
Coordinating the delivery of the 3d Armored Division’s equipment with the arrival of its
personnel, presented difficulties. The equipment was originally scheduled to arrive at the
Kasernes approximately 30 days before the personnel arrived. The Seventh Army disagreed withthis plan, because the approximately 700 vehicles involved could not be evacuated in an
emergency. The alternative adopted by the Seventh Army’s suggestion to receive, de-process,
and store the equipment in depots west of the Rhine River pending delivery to the stations on the
arrival dates of the 3d Armored Division’s increments. The Rhine Ordinance Depot as
considered the only suitable storage location, and the USAEUR Transportation Division could
make the necessary rail movements within a 72-hour period.
In the early spring of 1956, it appeared the exchange would create a shortage of such
equipment as gas masks, QM spare parts and post, camp and station-type property in Europe.
Shelter halves, blankets, field range components, and mess gear were in short supply to allow for
the replacement of the 4th Infantry’s unserviceable equipment before its rotation date. In April it
was discovered that adequate supplies for organizational clothing and equipment would not be
available for the incoming 3d Armored Division unless prompt action was taken. Moreover,
about 3,000 members of the 4th Infantry Division, which was not returning to the United States
as a unit but was to be scattered and its personnel reassigned, temporarily assigned to the
incoming 3d Armored Division, creating additional supply problems for the 3d Armored
Division. This problem was corrected by the rapid build-up of theatre stocks, supplies, clothing
and individual equipment and spare parts were acquired on a rush basis.
The original plans for the movement of the 3d Armored Division’s return to Germany for the first
time since the end of WWII, under Operation GYROSCOPE over a 30 day period beginning on
1 May 1956 as outlined in AR 220-20 was determined impractical, primarily because of the
division’s mission and unbalanced deployment of its combat commands after arrival in West
Germany. The actual move took more than 6 weeks. The first group of 3d Armored Division’s
1,600 troops and dependents arrived in Europe on 12 May 1956, and change of command
ceremonies were held 10 June 1956, but the complete movement of the 3d Armored Division
was not completed until 30 June 1956.
The technical details of GYROSCOPE-type movements continued to be well executed in
this exchange. Major General Robert W. Porter, Jr., commander of the advance party of the 3d
Armored Division, made this comment on the arrival of the first increment of the Spearhead
Division:
“The entire operation was conducted in an outstandingly efficient manner; appearance,
morale, and conduct of the troops was superior and the subject of much favorable comment from
impartial observers; despite the arrival of three ships on 12 May and berthing schedule being
disrupted by morning fog, the port staff maintained excellent control and the planned debarkation
and entraining schedules were met; troop train on which I rode was not overcrowded, had
comfortable berths, and served hot meals promptly; the dependent trains were on schedule; full
operational readiness I time in the least possible time; full supply and equipment were available
on station for the units; housing was assigned and hosts with keys were present.
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